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TAKING FEDERALISM SERIOUSLY
Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr. *
and
Alexander Dimitrief**
In 1976, the Supreme Court broke with forty years of New Deal-inspired
commerce clause jurisprudence to strike what appeared to be a significant
blow for federalism. In National League of Cities v. Usery,' the Court
invalidated Congress's extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 2
to state and local governments insofar as its provisions "operate[d] to
directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions." 3 As Justice Rehnquist ex-
plained:
It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws
regulating individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty
of the government of the Nation and of the State in which they reside.
It is quite another to uphold a similar exercise of congressional authority
directed, not to private citizens, but to the States as States.4
Almost ten years later, the Court abandoned this distinction in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.5 Deriding the standards
set forth in National League of Cities, the Court found that the normal
operations of the political process in Congress sufficiently safeguarded the
sovereign interests of states and communities. In an opinion delivered by
Justice Blackmun, the Court essentially renounced its role as keeper of the
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Assistant to the President of the United States for Political and Intergovernmental Affairs, October
1985-March 1986; Deputy Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs, May 1985-
October 1985; Presidential Appointee, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations; J.D.,
Georgetown University Law Center, 1979; A.B., Princeton University, 1971.
•* Associate, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Illinois; White House Fellow, Office of Political
and Intergovernmental Affairs, 1985-1986; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1985; B.A., Yale College,
1981.
1. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See generally L. TRa, AMEIucAN CoNsTruTnoNAL LAW §§ 5-20,
5-22, at 300-06, 308-18 (1978).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1985). The original act specifically excluded state and local
government entities from its coverage. In 1966, Congress amended the Act to cover workers
employed at state hospitals and schools. This extension was upheld by the Supreme Court. Maryland
v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 194-95 (1968). In 1974, Congress extended the Act to all state employees,
prompting the Court to overrule Wirtz in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 853-
54 (1976).
3. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852. In accordance with the Court's tenth
amendment cases, references in the text to states are intended to encompass local governments as
well.
4. Id. at 845.
5. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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"spirit of the Tenth Amendment."16 As Justice O'Connor complained in
dissent, "[A]II that stands between the remaining essentials of state sov-
ereignty and Congress is the latter's underdeveloped' capacity for self-
restraint." 7
As one might expect, Garcia's resuscitation of the FLSA vis-a-vis the
public sector, alarmed the intergovernmental community.' Seeking to avert
a possible $3 billion increase in labor costs9 and to salvage hard won
collective bargaining agreements, state and local officials stormed Capitol
Hill for legislative relief. On the surface, their success appeared to vindicate
the Garcia majority. In what one lobbyist called an "extraordinary"' 10
display of political clout, a bill allowing government employers to offer
time-and-a-half compensatory time off in lieu of overtime pay" breezed
through Congress without a single recorded (much less dissenting) vote
and, within nine months of the Garcia decision, was promptly signed by
President Reagan. The President praised the legislation for recognizing the
"special burdens, responsibility, and character"' 2 of state and local gov-
ernments, but cautioned that the new law amounted to no more than a
bandage for the wound inflicted on state and local governments by the
Garcia Court:
Although real improvement has been brought about by this legislation,
I believe the constitutional principles of federalism must be recognized
so that limits are placed on Federal regulation of State and local gov-
ernments in a manner consistent with their special status in our system
of government. In this and in other regards, federalism will remain a
major priority of my Administration.'"
6. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975). The Fry Court had declared: "The
Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a
fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system."
Id.
7. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
8. See generally N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1985, at Al, col. I (describing officials' fears that
Garcia would sharply increase their labor costs and pave the way for further congressional
intervention in state and local government).
9. Various efforts to estimate the Garcia decision's fiscal impact on state and local govern-
ments place the annual cost between $500 million and $3 billion. The Department of Labor
anticipates an annual cost of approximately $733 million, the Congressional Budget Office $0.5 to
$1.5 billion. See 52 Fed. Reg. 2025-28 (Jan. 15, 1987).
10. Cohodas, Fast Congressional Action Solves Worker Overtime Issue, 43 CoNo. Q. 2379
(1985).
11. The legislation also absolved employers from retroactive liability by postponing the
effective date of the 1974 amendments until April 1986. In addition, the legislation permits local
governments to exclude certain hours of work in calculating overtime compensation for employees
who work in two separate capacities for a city, and to amend the FLSA's definition of "employee"
so that government workers could provide volunteer services to their community outside their scope
of employment without having those hours count against their overtime thresholds. For the bill's
other provisions, see Fair Labor Standards Amendment of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150 (1985).




This Article explores Garcia's implications for what Justice Black aptly
called "Our Federalism.' 1 4 Part I examines the rationale behind the Garcia
majority's retreat from National League of Cities and posits that the Court
has slighted the constitutional status of state and local governments as
political sovereigns. Part II contends that, despite its immense symbolic
impact, Garcia poses only a minimal practical threat to state and local
autonomy. This conclusion is supported by the growing success state and
local governments have enjoyed since President Reagan took office in
attacking problems on a growing variety of public policy fronts. Part III
identifies federal mandates and conditional grants-in-aid as today's most
serious threat to a robust federalism and proposes an amendment designed
to channel the anxiety spawned by the Garcia decision into meaningful
protection of state and local governments under the Constitution.
I. THE GARCIA ILLUSION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY
A. The Road to Garcia
In National League of Cities, a narrow majority of the Court, asserting
that the states and their subdivisions are "coordinate element[s]' '5 in our
system of government, sought to place certain aspects of state sovereignty
beyond the reach of the commerce clause. 16 Justice Rehnquist launched
this effort by identifying as "one [such] undoubted attribute"' 17 the right
"to structure employer-employee relationships in such areas as fire preven-
tion, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recrea-
tion." 18 Yet, Justice Rehnquist pointedly made no pretense to having
exhaustively catalogued the various "integral . . .and traditional govern-
mental functions"' 19 which were to be afforded this immunity from con-
gressional enactments. 20
Portentously, Justice Blackmun conditioned his determinative fifth vote
for Justice Rehnquist's opinion on the understanding that National League
of Cities was establishing a balancing test under which a federal statute
could regulate even traditional governmental functions if the national
14. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
15. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 849.
16. Justice Rehnquist limited the opinion so as not to implicate statutes enacted by Congress
under the spending power, id. at 852 n. 17, war powers, id. at 854 n. 18, or the fourteenth amendment,
id. at 852 n.17. For a discussion of how this limitation nearly emasculated the National League of
Cities doctrine even before Garcia, see infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
17. 426 U.S. at 845.
18. Id. at 851. The FLSA regulations subsequently issued by the Department of Labor in
the wake of National League of Cities simply listed those services given as examples by Justice
Rehnquist as no longer subject to FLSA standards, and added two other services not listed in
Justice Rehnquist's opinion: libraries and museums. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 775.3, 775.4 (1986).
19. 426 U.S. at 852.
20. Id. at 851 n.16.
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interest in the regulation was "demonstrably greater" than the state's claim
for an exemption." In two pivotal offspring of National League of Cities,
Justice Blackmun would side with the original dissenters to vanquish their
fears that the "traditional government functions" test could emerge as a
weighty obstacle to congressional regulation of the states. 22
In Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) v. Mississippi,2' a 5-
4 majority upheld a federal utility statute that required state agencies to
follow prescribed procedures in considering certain rate structures and
operational standards set forth in the legislation. Although states remained
free to adopt standards different from those suggested in the legislation,
failure to consider the standards would result in federal occupation of the
field. 24 Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun viewed this conditional
preemption of an activity as a permissible "program of cooperative
federalism" 2 plainly within the reach of the federal commerce power,
notwithstanding Justice O'Connor's strident objection that Congress had
in effect "conscript[ed] state utility commissions into the national bureau-
cratic army." '2 6
EEOC v. Wyoming27 all but overruled National League of Cities. In an
opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court upheld the 1974 extension of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act's (ADEA) prohibition against man-
datory retirement laws to state and local governments. This prohibition
applies to all positions except those for which age permissibly is deemed a
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).28 Purporting to distinguish
the Court's invalidation in National League of Cities of a parallel amend-
ment to the FLSA, Justice Brennan found the ADEA's requirements less
intrusive in that a state retained the discretion either to comply with the
ADEA by establishing age as a BFOQ or to ensure the alertness of its
employees through individual tests. 29 It was not by accident that the EEOC
majority skirted the very point of the "traditional government functions"
test as first articulated by Justice Rehnquist: that the determination of such
21. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
22. The Court also revisited the National League of Cities inquiry in two relatively peripheral
cases. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assoc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981), reiterated
that federal statutes implicated the governmental function immunity only if they regulated the
"States as States." Id. at 287. In United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982),
a unanimous Court held that the State of New York was not entitled to a National League of
Cities exemption for its recently acquired Long Island Rail Road because regulation of railroads
has traditionally fallen to the federal government. Id. at 686-87.
23. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
24. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3203-3204,
16 U.S.C. §§ 824a-3, 2621-2623 (1982).
25. 456 U.S. at 767.
26. Id. at 775 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
27. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1982).
29. 460 U.S. at 232-33 (1983).
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occupational qualifications was, as an attribute of state sovereignty, for
public employers to make for themselves. Indeed, the transparency of
Justice Brennan's attempt to circumvent National League of Cities signaled
that its immunity for state and local governments was, if not already dead,
at best "moribund." ' 30
B. Garcia: The States as Sovereign Interest Groups
In Garcia, the EEOC majority forthrightly reversed National League of
Cities.3" The "traditional government functions" test, explained Justice
Blackmun, had simply proved "unworkable in practice. "32 This, he as-
serted, left the line of cases prompted by Justice Rehnquist's opinion
intolerably bereft of any organizing principles apart from unsatisfactorily
"freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty. ' 3 3 Fortunately, in Justice
Blackmun's view, this was now of little consequence.
The Garcia majority also reinterpreted the tenth amendment and its
jurisprudence to establish that the Framers had already placed adequate
political pressure points throughout the federal system to facilitate the
safeguarding of state prerogatives: state control over electoral qualifica-
tions, the electoral college, equal representation of each state in the Senate
and the election of those senators by the state legislatures.3 4 "State sovereign
interests," asserted Justice Blackmun, "are more properly protected by
procedural safeguards inherent in the . . . federal system than by judicially
created limitations on federal power." 35
30. The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARv. L. REv. 70, 200 (1983) [hereinafter The
Supreme Court].
31. Justice Blackmun does qualify Garcia by positing that more egregious affronts to state
sovereignty might still bump up against some affirmative limits on federal actions regulating the
states. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556. At bottom, however, Garcia reduces the National League of
Cities immunity to a hollow set of "horrible possibilities that never happen in the real world."
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946). See Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 Hav. L. Rav. 84, 97 (1985) [hereinafter
Field]. For instance, Congress still could not order a state to relocate its capital. See Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), cited with approval in Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556.
32. 469 U.S. at 546.
33. Id. at 550. In a classic non sequitur, Justice Blackmun also contended that the National
League of Cities test, by bestowing a constitutional imprimatur on certain "traditional government
functions," actually violated the spirit of federalism by somehow discouraging the states from
meeting "the changing needs of their citizenry by taking up functions that an earlier day and a
different society left in private hands." Id. at 546. National League of Cities cannot fairly be read
to have established any constraints on the reach of state and local governments in modern America.
Rather, it sought only to "ordain] an [inviolate] enclave of protected state functions." The Supreme
Court, supra note 30, at 203. Indeed, as Justice Powell noted in dissent, Justice Blackmun would
have had difficulty explaining "how leaving the States virtually at the mercy of the Federal
Government, without recourse to judicial review, will enhance their opportunities to experiment
and serve as 'laboratories."' Garcia, 469 U.S. at 568 n.13 (Powell, J., dissenting).
34. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-51.
35. Id. at 552.
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Neither line of the Garcia majority's reasoning conforms with the con-
tinued integrity that our Founding Fathers envisioned for the states as
sovereignties under the proposed Constitution. Justice Blackmun's relega-
tion of state and local governments to the political process is particularly
disquieting for several reasons.
First, even by Justice Blackmun's own admission, changes in the federal
government have diluted the states' influence in national politics. 36 Senators
are now elected by popular election, voter qualifications and legislative
apportionment are now largely regulated by Congress and federal courts,
state political parties have, in many cases, eroded to the point of irrelevance,
and, perhaps most importantly, the federal government has become so all-
encompassing that Congress rarely hesitates to leapfrog over state govern-
ments to address what had traditionally been deemed local problems.17
From a more pragmatic standpoint, the degree to which the effort to secure
relief from Garcia met with such rapid success is more likely to prove the
exception than the rule. For example, legislation introduced in response to
EEOC v. Wyoming in June 1985 to permit the mandatory retirement of
public safety officers at age fifty-five never made it out of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources. 8 When the Court ruled in
1982 that local governments qualified for the "state action" immunity
from antitrust actions only when carrying out a "clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed" state policy,39 it took a coalition of mayors and
county officials almost three years to prompt Congress to enact relief. And
this relief was only for claims seeking treble damages, leaving local gov-
ernmental entities exposed to the constant threat of injunctions.40
Most bothersome, however, is the Court's downgrading of state and
local governments to the status of yet another special interest group or
political action committee whose interests are protected, if at all, by the
grace of Congress I.4  "That these were governments whose internal terms
of employment Congress presumed to dictate," Professor Van Alstyne
observes, "seemed [not] to make any difference." ' 42 Even Justice Douglas,
not remembered by many as a champion of federal restraint, once dispar-
36. Id. at 554.
37. See id. at 565 & 565 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting); Howard, Garcia and the Values of
Federalism: On the Need for a Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 19 GA. L. REv. 789, 792-
93 (1985) [hereinafter Howard].
38. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1985, S. Doc. No. 1240, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1985).
39. Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 51 (1982).
40. See Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984).
41. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting); Kmiec & Diamond, New Federalism
is Not Enough: The Privatization of Non-Public Goods, 7 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 321, 328
n.33 (1984). See also Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 IwcH. L. REv. 1709, 1724
(1985) (contending that for the states "[e]ven to participate in [such] debate is in one sense to lose
it") (emphasis in original).
42. Van Alstyne, supra note 41, at 1712.
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aged the "notion that the sovereign position of the States must find its
protection in the will of a transient majority of Congress [as] foreign to
and a negation of our constitutional system." '43
Madison's Federalist No. 45 leaves little doubt that, in crafting a national
government of limited, enumerated powers, the Framers intended for the
states to continue to predominate the regulation of "all the objects which,
in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties
of the people.""4 This sphere of authority certainly included the delivery
of valuable public services to their communities. 5 To be sure, the federal
commerce power has since grown to encompass many private sector activ-
ities whose regulation once fell to the states, but it is only recently that
Congress has stretched its reach to assert workaday control over state and
local governments themselves.4 6
It was against this congressional overreaching that the National League
of Cities Court lodged its expansively worded protest. A government that
can no longer control its own internal modes of operation, as in Garcia,
or one that amounts to little more than a "puppet of the national bureauc-
racy ... to which Congress may assign problems for extended study, ' 1 7
as in FERC, is one largely devoid of meaningful sovereignty.48 Such second
class citizenship hardly befits the "active sovereignty ' 49 that, in Hamilton's
words, was reserved to the states "by the whole tenor of the ...Consti-
tution."°
43. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 594 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also
V. Ostrom, Garcia, Constitutional Rule, and the Central-Government Trap (Dec. 11, 1985) [here-
inafter Ostrom] (unpublished manuscript on file at the University of Indiana) (finding the argument
that the Framers chose to rely upon politics to delineate the spheres of state and federal authority
to be, in light of the general theory of limited constitutions, "implausible").
As Attorney General Meese has argued: "The reason for restoring federalism is not because
the states have somehow now proved themselves under the watchful parental eye of Congress and
the Supreme Court. Federalism must be restored because it is a basic constitutional principle."
Address by Attorney General Meese, The Conservative Political Action Conference (Jan. 30, 1986).
44. Tsm FnEDmLmsr No. 45, at 293 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
45. See, e.g., La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redur Intergovernmental
Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 779, 791 (1982) (power to
make political decisions includes power to determine the goods and services provided the community
and financed through taxes).
46. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 730 F.2d 339, 356-57 (5th Cir. 1984).
47. FERC, 456 U.S. at 775 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
48. See R. Nagel, Federalism as a Subject of Interpretation (Feb. 1986) (unpublished man-
uscript on file at the University of Colorado School of Law). Professor Nagel cogently argues that
"governmental status ... requires a capacity to inspire citizen loyalty by way of the kind of
symbolism common to all governments .... mhe symbolism of a government unable to control
the pay or working hours of its own employees is the symbolism of powerlessness rather than
sovereignty." Id.
49. Tam F)EDERALIST No. 45, supra note 44, at 290.
50. TmE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 201 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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In view of the importance the Framers attached to the continued viability
of state governments," Justice Blackmun's protestations over the unwork-
ability of the "traditional government functions" test hardly amount to a
justification for abandoning it.2 His protest seems particularly hollow
because it was the members of the Garcia majority who deliberately chose
to befuddle the National League of Cities inquiry in the line of cases
culminating in its reversal. 3
Instead, one would hope, as did Madison, that the Court could rise
to the task of refereeing "controversies relating to the boundary
between the two jurisdictions." '54 Indeed, lower courts have successfully
grappled with the analogous challenge posed by the various "home rule"
provisions of some forty state constitutions.5 5 Furthermore, had he
51. Tmm FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See Graglia, How
the Constitution Disappeared, 81 ComirrTARY 19 (Feb. 1986).
52. See Howard, supra note 37, at 793-94. See also Ostrom, supra note 43 (contending that
"persons knowledgeable of a general theory of a limited constitution [should be able to] construe
a constitutional contract, so to speak, in light of the declared intentions of the framers"). The
Court charted the preferred course for clarifying an unmanageable legal test in Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213 (1983). In an earlier line of cases grappling with the fourth amendment question of
when hearsay information from an informant can support a finding of probable cause to issue a
search warrant, the Court formulated what amounted to a multi-pronged flowchart that accom-
plished little more than tostrike fear into the hearts of unsuspecting first year criminal law students.
See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The
Gates Court, rather than throwing up its hands and embracing the Garcia-like solution of either
allowing or disallowing all hearsay evidence at magistrates' probable cause hearings, instead opted
to replace the Aguilar-Spinelli test with a more straightforward "totality of the circumstances"
approach that would lead to "practical, common-sense decision[s]." Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. See
The Supreme Court, supra note 30, at 177-85.
53. See Van Alstyne, supra note 41, at 1717 (contending that "those Justices originally in
dissent from Justice Rehnquist's analysis failed to treat it in the manner the Court has otherwise
wisely tended to do in equivalent circumstances associated with great cases: not as the final word
on the subject, but as the first words").
54. Tha FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
55. See, e.g., Baggett v. Gates, 32 Cal. 3d 128, 649 P.2d 874, 185 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1982)
(state laws seeking to assure fair labor practices may be applied to police departments); Kalodimos
v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 II. 2d 483, 470 N.E.2d 226 (1984) (village ordinance banning
possession of operable handguns did not violate home rule provision as being an enactment unrelated
to local problems); Summer v. Township of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 251 A.2d 761 (1969) (establish-
ment of Real Estate Commission by state did not preclude enactment of ordinance designed to
control "blockbusting" by brokers); Robin v. Village of Hampstead, 30 N.Y.2d 347, 285 N.E.2d
285, 334 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1972) (village lacked power to enact ordinance requiring that abortions be
conducted in accredited hospitals only); State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980) (state's
Corrupt Practices In Elections Act left county governments to determine for themselves whether
circumstances necessitate imposing a campaign disclosure requirement for city or county officials).
But see City of La Grande v. Public Empl. Retir. Bd., 576 P.2d 1204 (Or. 1978) (narrowing earlier
interpretations of Oregon's constitutional home rule provision to bar only those state laws implicating
"modes of local government," in part because it is more proper for the political system to decide
which level of government should pursue given "substantive social, economic, or other regulatory
objectives"). For general discussions of the "home rule" movement in the law governing local
governments, see Sandalow, The Limits of Municipai Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the
[Vol. 36:463
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wished,56 Justice Blackmun could have chosen from several promising
theories as points of departure for fine tuning Justice Rehnquist's initial
attempt at delineating a sphere of paramount state sovereignty.
First, in their Garcia dissents, Justices Powell and O'Connor echoed
Justice Blackmun's own concurrence in National League of Cities in ad-
vocating a conventional balancing of the federal and state interests impli-
cated by a congressional enactment." Justice O'Connor emphasized the
pivotal importance of "weighing state autonomy as a factor." 5 8
Second, lower federal courts, including the district court which originally
heard Garcia,5 9 had also developed several encouraging approaches to the
National League of Cities exemption. 60 The most promising among these
was that offered by the Sixth Circuit in Amersbach v. City of Cleveland.61
Under the Amersbach analysis, a governmental function qualified for an
exemption if it: (1) benefited the community as a whole and was provided
at little direct expense, (2) was undertaken for public service rather than
profit, (3) constituted an especially suitable endeavor for the government
because of a community wide need, and (4) was provided principally by
the government. 62
The pointed refusal of the Garcia majority to follow these alternative
analyses is all the more ironic when contrasted with the Court's often
demonstrated eagerness to engage in creative constitutional extrapolation
on even thornier issues, such as the judicially crafted right to privacy or
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643 (1964); Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA.
L. Ray. 1519 (1982).
56. Justice Blackmun purports to demonstrate the unworkability of the National League of
Cities inquiry largely by rejecting three "strawmen" not even supported by immunity advocates: a
purely historical standard, Garcia, 469 U.S. at 543-44; a "uniquely" government functions standard,
id. at 545; and "necessary" government services, id.
57. See id. at 562 (Powell, J., dissenting); Id. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Professor
Van Alstyne would go a step further than Justices Powell and O'Connor by explicitly tipping the
scales in favor of the states. See Van Alstyne, supra note 41, at 1717-18. He would deem the very
existence of a state or local activity to suffice "as clear evidence that the services it provides come
within the felt responsibilities of government in the first instance, as determined solely by the
constituents and representatives of that government." Id. at 1717. Congress could intervene only
if it "could back its authority with a judicially acceptable reason" that amounted to "more than
a mere naked preference to have state and local programs structured as Congress might like." Id.
at 1717-18.
58. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
59. See San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
60. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538-39 (citing lower court cases that address the National League
of Cities inquiry). Justice Powell chides Justice Blackmun for failing to "carefully analyzet] the
case law" and, as a result, mischaracterizing the lower courts' opinions as rendering "blanket
pronouncements that particular things inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or
did not." Id. at 561-62 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
61. 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979).
62. Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 1979).
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the first amendment freedoms of speech and religion. 6 Whatever side one
may take in the debate on judicial restraint that arises over such decisions,
it was perhaps this inconsistency that incited the dissenters' unusually
forthright and offended forecast of Garcia's forthwith reversal. 4 This new
found reticence also unmasks the majority's invocation of judicial restraint
as a shibboleth for a pronounced indifference to the prerogatives of state
and local governments as sovereigns within our constitutional order.
II. FEDERALISM AFTER GARCIA:
MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING MUCH
(AT LEAST FOR Now)
In their alarm at the Hamiltonian overtones of Justice Blackmun's
reversal of National League of Cities, critics of Garcia have sometimes
unwittingly exaggerated the decision's practical consequences. Beyond the
immediate irritant of state and local governments having to conform with
the FLSA, Garcia is typically said to mean increased costs, budget restric-
tions, and fewer opportunities for innovations by the state and local
officials. 65
On the surface, such analyses would appear both to overstate the practical
value of National League of Cities and to overestimate the resolve of a
new generation of state and local leaders to join President Reagan in
"tak[ing] Government back to the people." 66 At bottom, however, these
overstatements reveal an understandable discomfort at the overruling of a
celebrated decision that had come to serve as a "rallying cry" for enhanced
protection of state prerogatives under both the Constitution and federal
law. 67
63. Professor Nagel has concluded that legal scholars and, more importantly, the federal
bench, have become preoccupied with individual rights at the states' expense: "Those decisions that
do deal unambiguously with structural values for their own sake demonstrate less explanatory
creativity than do decisions dealing with rights, a fact that suggests a relative lack of judicial interest
in structural matters if not lower quality opinions." Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value:
National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 81, 83-84. Yet this distaste for
decisions addressing governmental structure appears to be confined only to those cases implicating
federalism. For instance, in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983), the Court did not hesitate to rock the federal government by declaring the legislative veto
unconstitutional, despite its presence "[in] nearly 200 ... [statutes) ... and its importance to
Congress." Id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting).
64. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Id. at 589 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
65. See Freilich, Greenhagen & Lamkin, The Demise of the Tenth Amendment: An Analysis
of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting Constitutional Federalism, 17 URB. LAW. 651, 653 (1985).
66. Address by President Ronald Reagan to the National Governor's Association, The White
House (Feb. 26, 1984) [hereinafter 1984 NGA Speech].
67. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1985, at A], col. 6.
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A. Placing National League of Cities in Perspective
As discussed in Part I, National League of Cities was already standing
on one leg before Garcia by dint of Justice Brennan's handiwork in EEOC.6
But, notwithstanding conventional wisdom in some quarters, the National
League of Cities rule served as an extremely modest restraint on Congress
even at the doctrine's high water mark.69 The renowned tenth amendment
cases that precipitated the court packing crisis had sought to cabin the New
Deal by carving out from interstate commerce a series of "purely local" 70
commercial activities that were to be regulated, if at all, exclusively by the
states.7' By contrast, National League of Cities, despite its far reaching
rhetoric, was carefully limited 72 to a very narrow issue: whether the com-
merce clause empowered Congress to regulate the states themselves in the
performance of their sovereign functions.73 Writing for the Court, Justice
Rehnquist, undoubtedly seeking to preserve a bare majority,7 4 expressly
declined to speculate whether the "traditional government functions" test
applied to federal statutes enacted pursuant to the spending power, 75 the
war powers, 76 or the fourteenth amendment. 77
As one might have expected, these qualifications led courts to confine
the "traditional government functions" inquiry to the commerce clause
context. 7 Less than a week after handing down National League of Cities,
68. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
69. For an especially stinging and over-reaching criticism of National League of Cities, see
Cox, Federalism and Individual Rights Under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U.L. Ray. 1 (1978).
70. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (Agricultural Adjustment Act declared
unconstitutional); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (National Industrial
Recovery Act declared unconstitutional). See generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YoUNo,
CoNsTrrTUONAL LAw 157-61 (2d ed. 1983).
72. See EEOC v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 503 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (M.D. Pa.
1983).
73. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Assoc., 452 U.S. 264, 289-90 (1981).
74. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
75. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 n.17. In his scathing dissent, Justice
Brennan flouted the majority opinion by suggesting that Congress could circumvent the Court's
new restrictions on the commerce clause power by "conditioning grants of federal funds upon
compliance with federal minimum wage and overtime standards . Id. at 880 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
76. See id. at 854-55 & n.18.
77. See id. at 852 n.17.
78. See, e.g., New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Serv. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 247
(1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 806 (1980) (amendments to the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act were not based on the power of Congress under the commerce clause and were not rendered
unconstitutional by the National League of Cities decision); Jennings v. Illinois Office of Educ.,
589 F.2d 935, 938 (7th Cir.) (National League of Cities test is inapplicable to a statute enacted
under the war powers), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). See generally Rotunda, The Doctrine of
Conditional Preemption and Other Limitations on Tenth Amendment Restrictions, 132 U. PA. L.
Rav. 289, 296-98 (1984).
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the Supreme Court itself, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, reaffirmed
that Congress could exercise the fourteenth amendment enforcement powers
to apply Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to public employers on the same
terms as to private employers.79 National League of Cities, notwithstanding
the stir it had created just four days earlier, was cited only once and in
only an obscure footnote distinguishing it as a commerce clause case.80
As for the hundreds of conditional grants-in-aid to the states, the courts
uniformly continued to employ a longstanding beggars-cannot-be-choosers
rationale to uphold whatever restrictions Congress imposed on the use of
federal funds. Because states participate in such programs only "voluntar-
ily," it is reasoned, they remain free to avert affronts to their sovereignty
by simply refusing the grants." And even under the commerce clause, the
FERC Court subsequently established that Congress could impose condi-
tions upon the continuation of state regulation in any field that could be
preempted by the federal government.8 2
Because this flexing of congressional muscle encroached upon the very state
prerogatives ostensibly insulated from federal regulation by National League
of Cities, the "traditional government functions" immunity in truth
amounted to little more than a sometimes irritating requirement that Con-
gress be careful to specify somewhere in a piece of legislation that it was
exercising a power beyond the reach of the National League of Cities
strictures. 83 Garcia, therefore, appears to mean little in terms of practical
consequences beyond reintroducing the FLSA to state and local government
employment.
79. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). See Hunter v. Underwood, 105 S. Ct. 1916
(1985).
80. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453 n.9.
81. See South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793 (1987) (state acceptance of federal highway
funds is voluntary; thus, conditioning receipt on adoption of minimum drinking age is valid use
of Congress' spending power); Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 790 (1983) (state's participation
i,. the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 was voluntary; therefore, regulation un-
der the Act does not violate the tenth amendment); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548
(1937) (holding that tax imposed under Title IX of the Social Security Act of 1935 does not impair the
essence of state sovereignty); Rotunda, supra note 78, at 296-97. See also La Pierre, supra note
45, at 860. In Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1981), the
Court did offer, without any elaboration, that there "are limits on the power of Congress to
impose conditions on the States pursuant to its spending power." But the courts have yet to identify
any such limits and these would no doubt be limited to especially egregious infringements on state
sovereignty.
82. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 771; supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text; Rotunda, supra
note 78, at 323.
83. La Pierre, supra note 45, at 879. For instance, most lower federal courts that faced the
question which confronted the Supreme Court in EEOC v. Wyoming upheld the extension of the
ADEA to public employers in part on the grounds that, whatever the outcome under National
League of Cities, Congress could have prohibited such age discrimination pursuant to the fourteenth
amendment. See, e.g., EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 603-09 (7th Cir. 1982); La Pierre, supra note
45, at 876 & n.373.
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B. State and Local Government in the 1980s: Garcia as a Sideshow
That Garcia has had little immediate impact on federalism has also been
forcefully demonstrated by how the nation's governors and mayors have,
except for the FLSA struggle, gone on about the business of governing as
if Justice Blackmun's opinion were little but an anachronistic nuisance. To
borrow the words of longtime government columnist James Kilpatrick, it
has become "increasingly evident" to all except, it seems, those constituting
the Garcia majority that:
the state governments, as a group, are governing more responsibly than
the national government. The most interesting political activity these
days is often not in the national capital, but in the state capital. The
tendency is to look at Congress with contempt, and to the statehouses
... with respect. The spirit of the 10th Amendment, enfeebled and
impoverished, may not be dead after all.14
Indeed, as a new breed of "doers and innovators" 5 take control of the
governors' mansions and city halls, a veritable blossoming of imagination
at the state and local levels of government promises to pioneer our country
into the 1990s.1 6 For example, numerous states and cities, seeking to
revitalize their economies, have teamed with private investors to attract
seed capital for high risk business ventures. Although the President's
proposal for federal enterprise zones remains bogged down in Congress,
twenty-seven states have forged ahead on their own. The 1300 plus enter-
prise zones that they have established since 1981 are credited with creating
over 75,000 jobs and triggering nearly $2.5 billion in capital investment.87
At last count, twenty-four states had begun to alter their welfare systems
through work related alternatives to outright payments,88 and thirty-four
had enacted civil justice programs designed to alleviate the liability insur-
ance crisis plaguing professionals and small businesses. 9
State and local governments have also made impressive gains on the
education front, arresting what many had feared was a rising tide of
mediocrity threatening our economic future. Some 250 special task forces
have devised and, in many cases, already implemented countless initiatives
84. Wash. Post, Feb. 11 1986, at A17, col. 1. See also 1984 NGA Speech, supra note 66
(welcoming "the renaissance of direct involvement-whether in the local schools or in neighborhood-
watch programs-and the reemergence of State and local government as significant forces in
determining the future of our country and the quality of life of our people").
85. Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1986, at A17, col 1.
86. See The Committee on Federalism and National Purpose, To Form a More Perfect
Union 5 (1985) (reporting that the 'estates have shown tremendous capacity for innovation in
education, economic development, controlling health care costs and other fields"); N.Y. Times,
Sept. 26, 1986, at A14, col. 1.
87. See Verstanding, Enterprise Zone Notes (Sept. 1986).
88. N.Y. Times, March 30, 1987, at A8, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
89. See Geisel & Taravella, Tort Reform Explodes: 34 States Enact Laws to Help Solve
Liability Crisis, Bus. INs. 1 (Aug. 18, 1986).
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involving teacher training and certification, merit pay, teacher career lad-
ders, innovative student testing, and increased financial support. 9°
But it is with respect to exercising fiscal discipline that the federal
government could most stand to learn from state and local actions. While
the federal government continues to have record deficits, state and local
governments have repeatedly run in the black with healthy surpluses: $58.3
billion in 1985, and a record $64.4 billion in 1984. 9' Virtually all city and
state budgets, unlike the federal government's, are balanced year after year.
These merit badges of political courage have not, of course, come easily.
City administrations, caught up in an almost frenzied efficiency wave, 92
have coped with shrinking financial resources by adopting innovative salary
plans, contracting out various services, and instituting users' fees. 93 Vir-
tually all fifty states have complied with balanced budget requirements 94
through a combination of tax increases95 and a variety of austerity measures,
ranging from hiring limits to deep spending reductions. 96
Such actions are politically distasteful at any level of government, but
state and local leaders stand a better chance of being rewarded (or at least
of not being punished) for formulating budgets responsibly. 97 State and
local governments last operated in the red in 1967, when expenditures
exceeded receipts by $1.1 billion. 98 Over that same period, the federal
government has averaged a $48.6 billion deficit, enjoying just one surplus
of $8.4 billion in 1969.99 This dramatic disparity in performance has not
escaped the notice of the American people. In all, an overwhelming majority
of the public believes that state and local governments spend tax dollars
and deal with problems more wisely than the federal government. I0°
90. See D. Doytm & T. HART, EXCEUENCE IN EDUCATION: THE STATES TAmt CHARGE 19-
39 (1985).
91. See Council of Economic Advisers, The Economic Report of the President 343 (Feb.
1986) (Table B-76) [hereinafter EROPJ.
92. Peirce & Guskind, Fewer Federal Dollars Spurring Cities to Improve Management and
Trim Costs, Nat'l L. J. 506 (Mar. 1, 1986).
93. See id.
94. Forty-four state governments operate under a constitutional mandate to balance their
budgets. In Arkansas, Connecticut, Maine, Mississippi, and New Hampshire, a balanced budget is
required by statute. Vermont is the only state that does not have a balanced budget requirement.
See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism
141 (1985-1986 ed.).
95. Georgia is the only state that has not enacted some form of tax increase over the past
five years. See id. at 74.
96. See Wash. Post, July 31, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
97. As government more closely approximates the Montesquieuan ideal of a republican
community, the more readily its citizens will appreciate a tangible trade off between tax increases
and spending reductions-a link nearly impossible to discern in the discombobulated federal budget
process. See Tushnet, Federalism and the Traditions of Political Theory, 19 GA. L. REV. 981, 989
(1985).
98. See EROP, supra note 91, at 373 (derived from Table B-76).
99. See id.
100. CBS News, The State of the Union 19 (Jan. 27, 1986) (Martin Plissner ed.).
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C. The Reagan Administration and Federalism:
A Governor Never Forgets
It is not by accident that such a resurgence of creative government in
our state capitols and cities has taken place during Ronald Reagan's
presidency. With the frustrations of grappling with Washington as a gov-
ernor still fresh in his mind, President Reagan took office in 1981 deter-
mined to stage "a quiet federalist revolution."' 0'° The President has since
doggedly waged this battle on three primary fronts: tax base sharing,
deregulation, and decentralization.
1. Sharing the Tax Base
Since 1981, the unprecedented Economic Recovery Tax Act has opened
up billions of dollars worth of maneuvering room for states and cities in
the national tax base. The Tax Act also required that these savings be
locked into place through indexing, and the President has since held a firm
and well- publicized line against "usurping revenue sources which otherwise
would [be] available to state and local governments." 102 As a result, the
federal government's share of tax receipts dropped from 65.3% in 1981 to
62.10o in 1983, leveling off at an estimated 62% in 1985. This is the federal
government's smallest share of the overall tax base since World War II.10a
In an address to the National Association of County Officials, the
President reiterated his belief that the most effective way to ensure a robust
federalism was
to continue to bring down the federal government's share of the tax
burden instead of confiscating and preempting so much of the tax source
.... It would be a lot better if we get back to only taxing what should
101. Address by President Ronald Reagan to the National Conference of State Legislatures,
Atlanta, Georgia (July 30, 1981).
102. Message to Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation (Feb. 25, 1983).
103.
Federal Receipts as % of













Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, supra note 94, at 11.
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be our fair share and leaving you tax sources out there that you can use
for problems which you see at your own level and have decided to do
something about.?°
2. Deregulation
State and local governments were among the principal beneficiaries of
the efforts of Vice President Bush's Task Force on Deregulation. They
received immediate one-time savings of an estimated $4 to $6 billion and
perpetual relief that could be worth as much as $2 billion annually.105 The
President has pledged to continue the Task Force's efforts by relaxing
federal regulations that impinge on state prerogatives and can be changed
without congressional approval. 0 6 In the same spirit, the Domestic Policy
Council is evaluating various proposals to require Congress to foot the bill
for any regulatory mandates it imposes on the states. 10 7 Finally, the Pres-
ident, lest anyone in the executive branch get the wrong, heavy-handed
idea from Garcia, recently issued a ten point Statement of Federalism
Principles (Box 1) intended to guide the cabinet agencies in both their
formulation and implementation of regulatory policy.
3. Decentralization
Based on a more ambitious proposal in the President's 1982 budget to
replace nearly eighty-four categorical grants-in-aid with seven broad based
block grants, Congress enacted nine block grants that consolidated fifty-
six categorical programs. 08 In addition to reducing the paperwork burden
on state and local governments by nearly five million manhours per year,'0 9
these block grants, by allowing state and local officials to assess their own
priorities, have enabled them to exercise "considerable discretion within a
broadly defined program area. . .[and thus become] increasingly important
... policy makers for Federal grant programs, not middle managers for
Federal agencies. "110
With the notable exception of the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982
(JTPA),""Congress has rebuffed the Administration's subsequent propos-
104. Address by President Ronald Reagan to the National Association of County Officials,
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 4, 1985).
105. Vice Presidential Task Force on Deregulation, Reagan Administration Regulatory
Achievements at 69 (Aug. 11, 1983).
106. 1984 NGA Speech, supra note 66.
107. Cf. The Intergovernmental Regulatory Relief Act of 1985, S. 483, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985) (requiring federal compensation for the additional direct costs incurred by state and local
governments in complying with intergovernmental regulations).
108. See Office of Management and Budget, Federalism: What Happened in 1981-84 11-1
(1985) (unpublished memorandum on file at the Office of Management and Budget).
109. Id. at 5.
110. Office of Management and Budget, Special Analyses of the FY 1987 Budget of the
United States Government H-24 (1986) [hereinafter Special Analysis H].
Ill. Pub. L. No. 97-300, 96 Stat. 1322 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982))l
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als to provide state and local officials with more flexibility in administering
federal grants.Y2 Yet the JTPA block grant has been such a success that
one wonders why its enactment has proven the aberration rather than the
rule. By replacing the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)
and ending the infamous bureaucracy it had engendered, JTPA put the
nation's governors in the driver's seat. Working with Private Investment
Councils, state and local officials responded by creating over 545,000 jobs
in 1985 alone. Nearly ninety-four percent of these jobs went to the eco-
nomically disadvantaged.113
Most recently, the President proposed three additional block grant ini-
tiatives in the FY 1987 budget. A new $3.3 billion transportation block
grant would have allowed states to refurbish roads, bridges, and transit
systems according to their own priorities. The primary health care block
grant would have been expanded to include narrow categorical programs
for black lung clinics, migrant worker health, and family planning. Finally,
a new pollution control block grant would have consolidated seven separate
programs touching on all aspects of the environment.' 1 4 These proposals
received little serious consideration by Congress. In his proposed FY 1988
budget, the President has resubmitted more modest block grant proposals
for secondary and rural highways and family planning programs. " 5
The result of the President's effort to rein in the federal government?
As David Broder reports,
For every inch Reagan has moved Washington out of domestic policy
responsibility, he has created irresistible pressure for the states to move
112. In his 1982 State of the Union Address, the President outlined an ambitious $50 billion
initiative that was quickly dubbed the "New Federalism Initiative." It comprised three major
components: (1) the states were to assume complete responsibility for financing the AFDC and
Food Stamps programs, while the federal government would take over a restructured Medicaid
system; (2) forty federal programs were to be turned back to the states together with excise taxes
to finance them; and (3) ten block grants were to consolidate selected education, welfare, employ-
ment, and housing categorical programs. Ultimately, however, the President never sent any legislation
up to the Congress because of heated disagreements within the intergovernmental community over
the particulars of the proposal and the political world's growing preoccupation with the 1982
recession. See generally Williamson, The 1982 New Federalism Negotiations, 13 Pu ous 14 (1983).
In 1983, the President submitted legislation to consolidate 34 of the programs proposed for
turnback in 1982 into four "mega-block" grants that would have given the states especially broad
leeway in using the federal funds. The proposal received only one relatively uneventful hearing
before the Joint Economic Committee. In 1984, the Administration proposed four block grants,
three of which would have consolidated ongoing categorical programs, and a fourth to provide $50
million in new appropriations for the states to use in training math and science teachers. Congress
passed only the latter.
Thus, despite President Reagan's focus on block grants throughout his first term, as of FY
1984, block grants still received less than 15% of total federal grant-in-aid dollars. See Office of
Management and Budget, Federalism: What Happened in 1981-84 supra note 108, at 11 1-12.
113. See 1984 NGA Speech, supra note 66.
114. See Special Analysis H, supra note 110, at H-4 to H-7.
115. See Office of Management and Budget, Special Analysis of the FY 1988 Budget of the
United States Government H-l, H-12 (1987) [hereinafter Special Analysis I].
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in . . . . The initiative on education, social and most economic and
environmental issues now rests in state capitols rather than in the U.S.
Capitol and the White House." 6
As the National Governors' Association heard at the White House in
February 1986, the President "happen[s] to think that [is] just what the
Founding Fathers had in mind. ' " 7
D. Beyond the "Traditional Government Functions" Test: Garcia as a
Harbinger of Further Erosions of Federalism
Then just what is it about Garcia that has led critics to decry it as the
"Second Death of Federalism?" ''1 For the reasons catalogued above, it is
indeed tempting to dismiss Garcia as having little impact aside from ending
an already narrowed and discreet doctrine.
Yet Garcia did more than upend the "traditional government functions"
test. In so sweepingly repudiating a decision that had come to be read as
a paragon of federalism, Justice Blackmun's opinion installed in the United
States Reports a vision of states' rights that threatens to spill over into
other jurisprudential contexts where the National League of Cities spirit
still reigns.
On its own terms, National League of Cities can be read as a logical
extension " 9 of cases in which the Court has openly fretted over the role
of the states in our federal system. By invoking the Pullman 20 or Younger12'
abstention doctrines, for example, the Justices' have repeatedly ordered
lower courts to stay their proceedings so that state court litigation can run
its course. 2
State and local governments have always been allowed considerable
leeway under the dormant commerce clause when maintaining the environ-
ment, "'23 and they now enjoy an entirely free hand when participating in a
116. Wash. Post, Dec. 8, 1985, at A6, col. 1.
117, 1984 NGA Speech, supra note 66.
118. Van Alstyne, supra note 41.
119. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at § 5-22, at 309.
120. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
121. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (overruling lower court order to stay state
court proceeding out of "a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the
entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the
belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free
to perform their separate functions in their separate ways").
122. See generally C. WRIoHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 302-20 (4th ed. 1983).
123. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 106 S. Ct. 2440 (1986) (Maine statute banning importation
of live baitfish does not violate the commerce clause because ban served legitimate local purpose
of protecting fisheries); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (Detroit's
Smoke Abatement Code was constitutional as applied to owners of ship prosecuted for emitting
dense black smoke on ship that operated in interstate commerce).
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commercial market as a buyer or seller.124 The Court defers to state and
local expertise in school financing, 25 prison management, 26 and law en-
forcement,1 27 and only sparingly reviews decisions by local governments to
exercise the zoning 28 or takings' 29 powers for policy purposes having little
to do with conventional land-use planning. 130 Federal statutes are inter-
preted restrictively so as not to preempt overlapping state measures.' 3 ' Most
recently, and in pointed contrast to its decision in Garcia, the Court has
broadened cities' immunity under federal antitrust laws32 and emphatically
invoked the eleventh amendment to curtail the states' susceptibility to suit
in federal court. 33
But with its broad rhetoric zeroing in on the structural importance of
state and local governments, National League of Cities transcended both
124. See, eg., White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employees, 460 U.S. 204 (1983)
(city that expended only its own funds in entering construction contracts for public projects was a
market participant and not subject to restraints of the commerce clause); Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (commerce clause does not prohibit a state from entering the
market as purchaser of potential articles of interstate commerce where the state restricts its trade
to its own citizens).
125. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (concluding
that Texas system was "rationally related" to a legitimate state purpose).
126. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974) (Court refuses to invalidate Cor-
rectional Department's guidelines concerning mail censorship in prisons).
127. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983) (Court refuses to enjoin
police department from searching and using chokeholds); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976)
(Court refuses to intrude on discretionary authority of local authorities to deal with citizen complaints
against police officer).
128. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986) (Court upholds
zoning ordinance that prohibits adult theatres from locating within 1,000 feet of residential areas);
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (Court upholds zoning ordinance which restricts
land use to one family dwellings); Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897
(9th Cir. 1975) (court states that it is up to state legislature to correct zoning plan that does not
serve the general welfare of its citizens), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
129. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (establishing that courts
should not interfere "where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose").
130. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (upholding
regulation of adult movie theaters).
131. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories Inc., 471 U.S. 707
(1985) (FDA regulations regarding collection of blood plasma does not preempt local ordinance);
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (federal law does not preempt state authorized
award of punitive damages); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 395 (9th
Cir. 1985) (Title VII preemption provision does not prevent states from extending nondiscrimination
laws to other areas).
132. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1985) (rent ceilings on residential
property do not violate Sherman Act); Town of Halie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713
(1985) (municipality's anticompetitive activities exempt from federal antitrust laws).
133. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 107 (1984)
(reviewing recent restrictions on such suits and barring immediate action because "it is difficult to
think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials
on how to conform their conduct to state law").
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these contextual federalism cases and its own "traditional government
functions" test to erect a judicial monument to state sovereignty throughout
constitutional law. 34 As such, the decision, despite having few direct
applications,' struck a responsive chord within the intergovernmental
community and served as a effective reminder to lower courts, the Congress,
and the White House 36 that state and local governments occupy a special
status in American society as a matter of constitutional law.
FERC and EEOC v. Wyoming, while undercutting National League of
Cities, at least left its symbolic value intact. Garcia, on the other hand,
has done more than remove National League of Cities from the federalism
landscape. Justice Blackmun's equally broad opinion counterposes a view
of states as mere interest groups which, like Justice Rehnquist's vision,
could carry over into other contexts.' As Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit
has observed in dissenting from a majority decision which held that Con-
gress had not abrogated the states' eleventh amendment immunity when it
enacted the Jones Act:
Garcia is an important case not only for what it says, but for the posture
in which the decision comes down. [As the] repudiation of... the water-
mark for state sovereignty ... [iut stands for the proposition that states
must fight for their sovereignty in the political arena.,3
134. See Field, supra note 31, at 114. As of July 1986, National League of Cities had been
cited 456 times by the lower federal courts.
135. National League of Cities has often been cited in cases where it has no direct application
as standing for the importance of federalism considerations. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. Supply v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (eleventh amendment); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448 (1980) (Public Works Employment Act); Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (commerce
clause market participant exception); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (Voting
Rights Act); Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (ad valorem property
tax).
136. See La Pierre, supra note 45, at 785 & n.22.
137. For example, in Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 656, 658
n.l (E.D. Cal. 1986), both parties advanced "lengthy discussion[s]" regarding Garcia's impact on
the Parker "state action immunity doctrine" under the Sherman Act. The court, however, did not
yield to this temptation and instead ruled that "Garcia simply does not affect this case." Id.
138. Welch v. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 780 F.2d 1268, 1287 (5th Cir. 1986)
(Brown, J., dissenting). But see id. at 1275-76 (Higginbotham, J., specially concurring) (finding "a
more direct corollary of Garcia" to be that "federal statutes not expressly applicable to states" are
not brought within a federal statutory scheme so as to invite intrusion into state affairs. "[I]f
legislation is silent or half-heartedly ambiguous as to its effect on states, and a court later declares
that it applies to states, the process will have been skewed and the states will have been effectively
sandbagged. The result would be a sidestepping of the structural protections outlined in Garcia and
a return of the judges from the sidelines"). Indeed, one lower court has already drawn upon
Garcia's underlying theme to emphasize in dicta the extent of Congress's power over the states.
See Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 558, 562 (C.D.
Cal. 1985) (citing Garcia to the effect that Congress could require the states to enroll their employees
under Title II of the Social Security System). See also Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Dep't of
Banking, 791 F.2d 1501, 1504 n.4 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Garcia as support for the "thought that
the day had passed when a congressional action could be challenged simply on the ground that it
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Indeed, several federal judges have seized upon Garcia to begin chipping
away at the protection afforded the states by the eleventh amendment. The
Court had earlier established that although states could be made to answer
in federal court for violations of federal law, Congress would be deemed
to have subjected the states to this jurisdiction under a given statute only
if it had done so unequivocally.3 9 The judges, reading Garcia to mean that
Congress should generally be viewed as having fully exercised its powers
vis-a-vis the states in the absence of an express limitation on its actions,
sought to lower the threshold finding required to subject the states to suit
in federal court. 140
In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,14 1 the Court foreclosed this
application of Garcia by raising the threshold to require that Congress
make its intention to override the states' immunity "unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute.' 1 42 Disagreeing with the Court, however, Justice
Blackmun tellingly welcomed the judges' efforts to reconsider the abro-
gation doctrine:
The Court's Eleventh Amendment cases spring from the same soil as the
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence recently abandoned in Garcia .... The
intuition underlying [them] is no truer to the federal structure or to a
proper view of congressional power than was that underlying National
League of Cities.'41
Justice Blackmun's dissent is a sign that, having won an important battle
in Garcia, he may continue to wage the fight on the several fronts where
a National League of Cities outlook still holds sway. Should the Court
ultimately reinstate the "traditional government functions" test, the Garcia
is taken within a sphere of traditional state control"); Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc. 772 F.2d
1140, 1148 (4th Cir. 1985) (generalizing Garcia to refute defendant's claim that the tenth amendment
barred the federal government from applying ERISA to a private sector employer). But see North
Carolina State Bd. of Registration for Professional Eng'rs & Land Surveyors v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 615 F. Supp. 1155, 1162 n.7 (C.D.N.C. 1985) (clarifying that states are entitled to special
disposition under ripeness tests in part because "[a]lthough the Commission would like the court
to believe differently, Garcia ... does not write the tenth amendment out of the Constitution").
139. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979); Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health
& Welfare of Missouri v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare of Missouri, 411 U.S. 279, 284
(1973).
140. See Welch v. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 780 F.2d 1268, 1286-87 (5th Cir.
1986) (Brown, J., dissenting); Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. New Jersey Transit Rail
Operations, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1216, 1221-22 (C.D.N.Y. 1985). Cf Richard Anderson Photography
v. Radford Univ., 633 F. Supp. 1154, 1160 n.13 (W.D. Va. 1986) (inferring from Garcia that the
distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions is no longer valid in the eleventh
amendment context).
141. 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985).
142. Id. at 3147.
143. Id. at 3179 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Green v. Mansour, 106 S. Ct. 423, 432-
33 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Garcia as evidence that "the Court's Eleventh Amend-
ment approach is ... sterile ... and is in serious need of reconsideration").
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dissenters will have done well, as Justice O'Connor put it, just "to hold
the field and . . . render a little aid to the wounded.' 44
III. A TENTH AMENDMENT FOR THE NEXT CENTURY OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM
Even if the Court were to overrule Garcia, the reinstitution of the
"traditional government functions" test would not directly loosen the
federal government's indirect choke-hold on state and local governments.
If federalism is to be taken seriously, the Constitution should be amended
to blunt what Kansas State Senator Ross Doyen calls the Golden Rule of
Intergovernmental Affairs: He who has the gold rules. 4
Today's network of conditional intergovernmental grants can be traced
back to the Lincoln Administration. The Morrill Act,1 46 passed in 1862,
provided the states with land grants for colleges, but only if the schools
instituted a specified curriculum and complied with the Act's annual re-
porting requirements. Little did President Lincoln know where his inno-
vation would lead. As of 1986, federal grants totaled $112.4 billion, and
constituted 11.4% of total federal outlays and approximately 20.6% of
total state and local expenditures. 47
By the time the Reagan Administration took office, the intergovernmental
grant system had become an administrative nightmare. 4 Despite six years
of effort and some deregulatory process, the basic framework remains.' 49
Some 81.7% of federal grants are categorical, meaning they carry with
them legislative and regulatory mandates, often require matching funds
from recipient governments, and afford state and local officials minimal
144. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Manfredi v. Hazleton City
Auth., 793 F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 1986) (rejecting appellants' argument that "Garcia stands for
the proposition that a federal court may construe a federal labor law, not specifically designed to
protect public employees, to demand that such employees receive the protection of that law").
145. Address at the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations Symposium on
Garcia, The Indiana University Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington,
Indiana (Feb. 18, 1986).
146. 12 Stat. 503 (1862).
147. See Special Analysis I, supra note 115, at H-22.
148. See, e.g., J. Chubb, The Political Economy of Federalism, PoL. Sci. REv. 994 (1985)
(concluding that "contemporary federalism is not, as the traditionally sanguine view would have
it, an efficient system for sharing the economic, political, and administrative responsibilities of
modern government, but rather, one that, through the initiative of the national government, has
become wasteful, cumbersome, and, as often as not, unsuccessful"); Stanfield, What Has 500
Parts, Costs $83 Billion, and is Condemned by Almost Everybody - Answer: The Chaotic System
of 500 Categorical Grant Programs, Nat'l L.J. 4-9 (Jan. 3, 1981). In a study by the Advisory
Committee on Intergovernmental Relations, state and local officials declared most federal regulations
to be "expensive, inflexible, inefficient, inconsistent, intrusive, ineffective and unaccountable."
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Regulatory Federalism: Policy, Process,
Impact and Reform 3 (1984) [hereinafter Regulatory Federalism].
149. See supra note 113.
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discretion in their use. 50 As of 1978, 1260 federal mandates were in place,
913 of which were conditions of federal assistance. 5 ' More recently, the
Office of Management and Budget identified sixty-eight "crosscutting re-
quirements": freestanding national policy requirements that apply to all
federal financial assistance programs.5 2 And as the web grows more tan-
gled, the states' and cities' compliance costs become more prohibitive. One
study revealed that it annually costs six selected cities $61.6 million to
comply with just five mandates."5 3
Federal grants-in-aid have given new meaning to the old adage that "a
helping hand can become a heavy hand."' 5 4 In the course of his famous
dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,'" Justice Brandeis noted that
it was "one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
naive social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country."' 15 6 Federal grants not only usurp the tax base, thereby preventing
states from raising tax dollars for their own initiatives, but also, through
rigid conditions, promote often undesirable and almost always unimagin-
ative national uniformity.
Finally, conditional federal grants-in-aid relegate the states to serving as
little more than links in an administrative chain of command. Yet as
Professor Daniel Elazar cogently argues, their true role under the Consti-
tution is "to function as polities, not as middle managers . . . . [Their]
principal tasks are to govern-to make and implement policies within their
spheres of competence-not simply to administer programs developed out-
side of their jurisdiction."'5 7
It is precisely this slighting of state prerogatives that led President Reagan
to promise "to put an end to the money merry-go-round where our money
becomes Washington's money, to be spent by the states and cities only if
they spend it exactly the way the federal bureaucrats tell them to."' The
150. See Special Analysis I supra note 115, at H-250.
151. See Statement of Dr. Adam Rose Before the Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee
of the Senate Government Operations Committee, Hearings on S. 483, The Intergovernmental
Regulation Relief Act of 1985 (May 14, 1985).
152. Office of Management and Budget, Directory of Policy Requirements and Administrative
Standards for Federal Aid Programs (1985).
153. Muller & Fix, The Impact of Selected Federal Actions on Municipal Outlays, in Joint
Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, 5 Special Study on Economic Change 368 (1980). The
six cities selected were: Burlington, VT; Alexandria, VA; Cincinnati, OH; Dallas, TX; Seattle, WA;
and Newark, NJ. The mandates involved the Clean Water Act, education of the handicapped,
unemployment compensation, access for the handicapped, and bilingual education.
154. See Regulatory Federalism, supra note 148, at 3.
155. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
156. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
157. Elazar, States as Polities in the Federal System, 70 NAT'L Cvic. REv. 77, 77 (1981).
158. Address by Governor Ronald Reagan Accepting the Republican Party's Nomination for
President, The Republican National Convention, Detroit, Michigan (July 17, 1980).
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following amendment, 9 a variant of which was presented for consideration
to the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, would serve
as a useful point of departure for reestablishing meaningful protection for
state and local governments:
Sec. 1. Congress shall pass no law abridging the freedom of the people
of the several states to govern their own affairs, provide for a constitution
and laws, raise revenue, secure public employees and otherwise structure
the delivery of public services, or exercise all other powers necessary and
proper to promote the general welfare. Nothing in this article shall be
construed to restrict the power of Congress to enforce the provisions of
this Constitution.
Sec. 2(a). Congress shall pass no law placing conditions or restrictions
on the expenditure of United States funds by any state or legal subdivision
thereof unless the conditions or restrictions are agreed to under a contract
between the United States and such state or legal subdivision providing
for such funds to be paid directly by the United States into the treasury
of such state or legal subdivision.
(b). Conditions and restrictions placed by the Congress or the Executive
Branch upon the expenditures of United States funds by any state or
legal subdivision thereof shall, absent the consent of the latter, apply
only to those funds paid under a program authorized in law enacted
after the date of enactment of such conditions and restrictions.
Section 1 would buttress the "traditional government functions" test as
articulated in National League of Cities. It would overrule FERC by
guaranteeing the states a paramount right to organize the processes of state
and local governments and would specifically overrule Garcia.
Section 2(a) would allow conditions to be imposed on the expenditures
of federal funds only after specific contractual negotiations had taken place
between the administering federal agency and the recipient state or local
government. This measure would not only prevent Congress from covertly
passing on the cost of such mandates to local government, but would also
allow state and local officials more flexibility in tailoring federal programs
to the needs of their jurisdictions.
Section 2(b) would prevent Congress from placing further conditions on
a federal grant once a state or city had already begun to participate in the
program. The section would also bar the government from unilaterally
imposing new mandates in connection with programs already in existence
before the effective date of Section 2(a).
This proposal will stir controversy, but the resulting debate could not
raise a more vital question: What are the proper functions of the federal,
159. The amendment is based on that proposed in the Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations, Reflections on Garcia And Its Implications for Federalism 44, 47 (L. Hunter &
R. Oakerson eds. 1986). The amendment proposed in this article should prove less controversial
than that presented to the ACIR. In contrast to the ACIR proposal, which sought to reserve a
substantive area of authority for the states over "local affairs," this article's proposal is narrowly
tailored to provide relief only against direct regulation of local governments. Although one can
debate the results of the federal government's expansion into policy areas previously regulated by
the states, that is altogether another fight.
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state, and local governments? Should Washington be in effect leveraging
local action in policy areas such as energy, the environment, agriculture,
transportation, community and regional development, education, worker
training, food and nutrition assistance, and criminal justice?
Like the "traditional government functions" test, the amendment might
also require some careful analysis by the courts. But does the vitality of
our federalism, once called "the cardinal question of our constitutional
system"' 60 by President Woodrow Wilson, deserve any less?




I. Federalsim is rooted in the knowledge that our political liberties are best assured by limiting
the size and scope of the national government.
II. The people of the States created the national government when they delegated to it those
enumerated governmental powers relating to matters beyond the competence of the individual
States. All other sovereign powers, save those expressly prohibited the States by the Con-
stitution, are reserved to the States or to the people.
III. The constitutional relationship among sovereign governments, State and national, is for-
malized in and protected by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.
IV. The people of the States are free, subject only to restrictions in the Constitution itself or in
constitutionally authorized Acts of Congress, to define the moral, political, and legal character
of their lives.
V. In most areas of governmental concern, State and local governments uniquely possess the
constitutional authority, the resources, and competence to discern the sentiments of the
people and to govern accordingly. In Jefferson's words, the States are "the most competent
administrations for our domestic concerns and the surest bulwarks against antirepublican
tendencies."
VI. The nature of our constitutional system encourages a healthy diversity in the public policies
adopted by the people of the several States according to their own conditions, needs, and
desires. In the search for enlightened public policy, individual States and communities are
free to experiment with a variety of approaches to public issues.
VII. Acts of the national government-whether legislative, executive, or judicial in nature-that
exceed the enumerated powers of that government under the Constitution violate the principle
of federalism established by the Founders.
VIII. Policies of the national government should recognize the responsibility of-and should
encourage opportunities for-individuals, families, neighborhoods, local governments and
private associations to achieve their personal, social, and economic objectives through
cooperative effort.
IX. In the absence of clear constitutional or statutory authority, the presumption of sovereignty
should rest with the individual States. Uncertainties regarding the legitimate authority of the
national government should be resolved against regulation at the national level.
X. These principles should guide the departments and agencies of the national government in
the formulation and implementation of policies and regulations.
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